






Sampson (this issue) argues for a concept of “realistic grammatical de-
scription” in which the distinction between grammatical and ungram-
matical sentences is irrelevant. In this article I also argue for a concept of
“realistic grammatical description” but one in which a binary distinction
between grammatical and ungrammatical sentences is maintained. In
distinguishing between the grammatical and ungrammatical, this kind of
grammar differs from that proposed by Sampson, but it does share the
important property that invented sentences have no role to play, either
as positive or negative evidence.
Our propensity to make mistakes, and the fact that many people are
forced to speak and write in a language that is not their native one
means that sentences are produced which contain grammatical errors.
These naturalistic ungrammatical sentences, as opposed to the invented
starred examples often used within the linguistics community, have been
dismissed as uninteresting. Although I do not wish to give naturalistic
ungrammatical sentences the prominence given by Carnie (2002) to in-
vented ungrammatical sentences when he suggests that it is necessary to
determine the ungrammatical sentences in a language in order to deter-
mine the grammatical ones (see Sampson, this issue), I do, however,
think that naturalistic ungrammatical sentences are of interest to lin-
guists studying language production, language loss and language learn-
ing, and that the grammatical/ungrammatical distinction cannot there-
fore be completely dismissed. Also, for grammar development within
the field of natural language processing, the grammatical/ungrammatical
distinction cannot be ignored or denied because this can lead to the
development of grammars which do not accurately analyse ungrammati-
cal sentences. This article focuses particularly on this second argument
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in favour of maintaining the grammatical/ungrammatical distinction,
and when I speak of grammar development, I am particularly thinking
of those large scale natural language grammars which are used to auto-
matically parse natural language.
Linguistic evidence in the form of grammaticality judgements can be
used to distinguish grammatical sentences from ungrammatical ones but,
crucially, these judgements should be made only on naturalistic data in
context. Sampson (this issue) argues that Chomsky’s conception of lan-
guage as a set of sentences, with the role of a linguist to establish which
strings are in this set, is unhelpful because it focuses undue attention on
the grammatical/ungrammatical distinction: I believe that an unfortu-
nate consequence of this definition of language is that it places too much
emphasis on the sentence as an isolated unit.
2. Grammars for natural language processing
A fundamental debate within the linguistics community has concerned
what it is a grammar is supposed to model: should a grammar model
competence or performance? Should a grammar reflect a psychological
reality or a social reality? Lamb (2000), for example, distinguishes be-
tween a “theory of the linguistic extension” which is a theory of the
utterances produced by a speaker or community, and a “theory of the
linguistic system” which is a theory of the human cognitive system which
is capable of producing and understanding such utterances. In the practi-
cal domain of natural language processing, there is no such debate. The
grammar of a computer parser which is to form part of a practical appli-
cation must be a theory of the linguistic extension and must describe
the productions of a speech community. In proposing the competence/
performance distinction, Chomsky remarked that the language produced
by a speech community is rife with slips and imperfections (Chomsky
1961: 130131). Therefore, if a computer parser has to accurately parse
actual language, it will have to accurately parse imperfect language, in
particular the kind of imperfect language that we routinely produce and
are capable of understanding. It will be able to do this if it is equipped
with some knowledge of deviant sentence structures.
A precision grammar distinguishes between the grammatical and the
ungrammatical and purposely describes only grammatical sentences. An
example is the English Resource Grammar (ERG) (Copestake and Flick-
inger 2000), a broad coverage HPSG grammar of English. Baldwin et
al. (2004) make the point that, if a grammar is to form the basis of a
natural language processing system which performs not just sentence
parsing but also sentence generation, it should not be able to generate
ungrammatical sentences. A parser using such a grammar will reject un-
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grammatical sentences outright. However, a parser which gives the re-
sponse “no” or “ungrammatical” to a sentence such as (1),1 may be
capable of distinguishing between the grammatical and ungrammatical
but of what practical use is this ability if it cannot hint at the meaning
of an utterance whose ill-formedness is quite commonplace?
(1) Want to saving money?
Of course, one could argue that robust parsing techniques (such as con-
straint relaxation (Fouvry 2003) or parse-fitting (Penstein Rose´ and Lavie
1997)) could be employed to handle ungrammatical sentences but such
techniques will be more effective if they are tailored to specific types of un-
grammatical language  a natural extension of this is then to actually let
the grammar describe the structure of ungrammatical sentences in the
same way that it describes the structure of grammatical sentences.
A parser whose grammar is derived automatically from a treebank of
naturalistic sentences is unconcerned with whether or not a sentence is
grammatical. Typically, grammaticality is assumed, and this assumption
will be quite accurate if the treebank sentences come from a high-quality
newspaper such as The Wall Street Journal. The fact that such grammars
do not purposely set out to exclude ungrammatical sentences together
with the fact that such grammars are generally based upon a large body
of data means that parsers equipped with such grammars are quite likely
to return a parse for an ungrammatical sentence. However, since such a










Figure 1. Parse returned by Charniak’s parser for sentence (1)
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that there is something deviant about the sentence, with the result that
the parse it produces for the sentence will not necessarily be the correct
one, that is, it will not necessarily reflect what the person who produced
the ungrammatical sentence intended to express. For example, Charni-
ak’s most recent parser2 (Charniak 2000) will provide the reasonable
parse in Figure 1 for sentence (1) but it is less successful, for example,
on the ungrammatical (2), returning the parse in Figure 2.










Figure 2. Parse returned by Charniak’s parser for sentence (2)
3. Grammar requirements
The following are the requirements for the type of grammar which I
believe should be developed by computational linguists and used by a
parsing system:
1. The grammar should have a component which describes the structure
of the grammatical sentences that occur in language.
2. The grammar should have a component which describes the structure
of the ungrammatical sentences that occur in language.
Like a treebank grammar, this grammar aims to be a direct reflection
of language rather than an indirect inflection via linguistic intuition.
However, unlike a treebank grammar, this grammar does explicitly dis-
tinguish between the grammatical and the ungrammatical, and this dis-
tinction relies on linguistic intuition. This distinction is binary, but this
does not mean that the rules in each component of the grammar cannot
be probabilistic. A linguistic structure described in the first grammatical
component of the grammar could be assigned a probability based on
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how frequently this structure appears in grammatical data. Similarly, a
linguistic structure described in the ungrammatical component of the
grammar could be assigned a probability based on how frequently this
structure shows up in ungrammatical data. The grammatical component
of the grammar is quite similar to a precision grammar which has been
tested using corpus evidence. An example is the afore-mentioned ERG
which has been tested using sentences from the British National Corpus
(Baldwin et al. 2004). The ungrammatical component is, of course, not
implemented by a precision grammar.
What kind of evidence is needed in order to develop and test the
second component of the grammar, the part of the grammar which de-
scribes ungrammatical sentences? Since this grammar is to form the basis
of a parsing system, its description of ungrammaticality must reflect the
kind of ungrammaticality that actually occurs in language. This means
that naturalistic ungrammatical sentences will be needed as evidence
rather than imagined ones. Baldwin et al. (2004) argue that naturalistic
ungrammatical sentences such as (1) or (2) constitute “haphazard noise”
and are useful only to test that a grammar does not overgenerate. I
am arguing that a grammar that is capable of generating the kind of
ungrammatical sentences that people actually produce, is not guilty of
overgeneration, provided that the grammar knows that these kinds of
sentences are ungrammatical. Therefore, to test the second ungrammati-
cal component of the grammar, which is essentially a theory of real
ungrammaticality, it is necessary to collect a corpus of naturalistic sen-
tences which are considered by speakers of the language to be ungram-
matical.
How does this definition of grammar relate to the one suggested by
Sampson (this issue)? The two are broadly in agreement since they aim
to describe language as it is actually used and both reject the need for
negative evidence in grammar development. According to Sampson
(2001, and footnote 3, this issue), if a grammar is constructed so that it
excludes sentences whose structure has not actually been observed, then
negative evidence becomes irrelevant. In order to exclude a sentence
from the grammar, it is not necessary to verify that it is ungrammatical.
It is enough not to have observed the sentence in practice. Once the
sentence is observed, then this observation has the potential to count as
a refutation of a grammar which excludes the sentence, and the grammar
will need to be modified accordingly. As Sampson notes, this is Popper’s
view of the nature of a scientific theory: it should maximize the number
of statements it makes which are refutable by observable evidence.3
Where the two notions of grammar differ is in their treatment of situa-
tions when an ungrammatical sentence such as (1) (repeated for conven-
ience as (3)) is actually observed.
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(3) Want to saving money?
(4) Want to save money?
(5) Want to start saving money?
Surely, if such a string is observed, it should serve as a refutation of
any grammar which prohibits it and the grammar in question would
need to be modified so that it no longer prohibits this sentence? Sampson
(2001) argues that the grammar should not be changed to accommodate
such an observation since our knowledge that people make mistakes in
language (such as omitting a word, using the wrong verb form, etc.)
should allow us to relate this sentence to another sentence such as (4) or
(5), both of which are accommodated by the grammar, thereby discount-
ing the observation as a genuine refutation. The ungrammatical sentence
(3) would, however, be included in the grammar described here, although
it would still be recognised as a different kind of observation to a sen-
tence such as (4) or (5) and thus would be included in the second un-
grammatical component of the grammar. Recognizing it as a different
kind of observation is the same thing as making a grammaticality judge-
ment, and a method to make this kind of judgement as reliably as pos-
sible is described in the next section.
The type of grammar suggested by Sampson could actually be used as
the grammatical component of the grammar advocated here. It would
include rare and odd constructions (Sampson’s Dunster constructions),
and if it was a probabilistic grammar it could encode rareness, without
linking this rareness in any way to grammaticality. In fact, because of
the clear distinction between the two components of the grammar, the
concepts of grammaticality and frequency are not conflated. This non-
conflation is a positive thing, regardless of where one stands with respect
to Sampson’s claim that frequency data cannot be used to predict gram-
maticality status (see Sampson’s discussion of noun phrase variability in
the SUSANNE treebank, this issue).
4. Judging grammaticality
The use of grammaticality judgements as linguistic evidence has always
been controversial. A large body of literature spanning several decades
casts doubt on the validity of grammaticality judgements (see for exam-
ple Labov 1972; Derwing 1979; Schütze 1996). These critiques cover vari-
ous problems with the judgement process: defining grammaticality,
choice of informant, the measurement scale used to measure judgements
and the role of sentential context. After concluding that the grammati-
cality of a sentence cannot be inferred from its frequency, Sampson (this
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issue) dismisses as scientifically suspect the alternative method of using
grammaticality judgements. The fact that it is difficult to reliably infer
grammaticality is one of the arguments he uses to support his claim that
the concept of grammaticality should be more or less ignored in gram-
mar development. I disagree to a certain extent: in building treebanks
(which are now a fundamental ingredient for natural language process-
ing), we rely on the linguistic intuition of the treebank annotators to
parse sentences, and I think that it would be useful to view the grammati-
cality judgement process in a similar way  as a necessary evil. Gram-
maticality judgements, although undoubtedly problematic, can be used
to effectively carve out a grammatical/ungrammatical distinction (albeit
not a particularly exciting one), and I focus for the rest of the article on
how this might be achieved, dealing particularly with the problems of
sentential context and defining what it means for a sentence to be un-
grammatical.
5. Defining “ungrammatical”
In order to observe instances of ungrammatical language in the language
that one encounters as a part of everyday life, it is necessary to be able
to tell whether something is actually ungrammatical. It is clear that a
definition of the term “ungrammatical” is needed in order to be able to
make consistent grammaticality judgements. The concept of “ungram-
matical” is, of course, a slippery one: it can be used in an everyday and
in a theoretical sense, and coming up with a definition of the term will
depend on what kind of linguistic information one believes should fall
under the remit of grammar. Thus, a definition such as Definition 1 is
unhelpful because it merely shifts the problem onto the grammar.
Definition 1. Possible Definition of “Ungrammatical”
A sentence is ungrammatical if it cannot be generated by the grammar
rules of the language.
To overcome this problem an operational definition which avoids the
term “grammar” completely is needed. The definition has two conditions
which must be satisfied for a sentence to be considered ungrammatical.
It is given as follows:
Definition 2. Definition of “Ungrammatical”
A sentence is ungrammatical if
1. It contains an error.
2. All the individual words in the sentence are well-formed words of the
language in question.
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The first condition states that an ungrammatical sentence must con-
tain an error. The word “error” is used here to mean either a mistake
which occurs as an oversight or a language-learning error which occurs
as a result of a lack of knowledge of the language. The second condition
in Definition 2 focuses attention on the inter-word level rather than the
intra-word level, which means that a sentence such as (6) will satisfy this
condition for ungrammaticality whereas a sentence such as (7) will not.
(6) Attempts for this seem to have gone to far.
(7) Atttempts for this seem to have gone too far.
This definition of “ungrammatical” is intended to be independent of
any particular linguistic theory and should be applicable by both lin-
guists and non-linguists. Of course the decision over whether a sentence
contains an error is a subjective one because it depends on a person’s
opinion about what constitutes an error but I would argue that some
level of subjectivity is unavoidable in any linguistic task whether that be
applying a grammaticality judgement or building a treebank (see Samp-
son and Babarczy 2003 for a related discussion on the problem of quanti-
fying annotator variation and precision in treebank development). It is
possible, for example, that a person who has been educated in the 1950s
or before may genuinely consider that a clause ending in a preposition is
erroneous, whereas someone who has been educated in the 1990s would
probably not even be aware that such a construction was once frowned
upon. The letters page of a Dublin newspaper from August 2003 con-
tains a letter decrying as “unacceptable” the newspaper’s use of the word
And to start a sentence. To overcome this problem, which I think will
exist no matter how the word “ungrammatical” is defined, it might be
necessary to produce a set of guidelines to accompany the definition, in
the same way that treebank annotators work with a set of bracketing
guidelines (e. g., Bies et al. 1995). Such guidelines could suggest, for ex-
ample, that a sentence such as (8) does not contain an error, whereas a
sentence such as (9) does.
(8) One of the clauses, which we have a big problem with, is that they
own the intellectual property.
(9) One of the clauses, which for we a big problem with, is that they
own the intellectual property.
6. Sentential context
Chomsky’s definition of a language as a set of sentences (Chomsky 1957:
13) emphasized the sentence as an individual unit of investigation, and
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grammaticality judgements have usually been made on sentences appear-
ing in isolation from a discourse context. In order to explain why senten-
tial context cannot be ignored, it is useful to consider the information
being judged when judging a sentence’s grammaticality. The aspect of a
sentence that is being judged is the sentence’s structure, which is one
aspect of the sentence’s meaning. If a valid structure for the sentence can
be determined, it will be accepted as grammatical. In a sentence like
Chomsky’s Colorless green ideas sleep furiously, the structure is the only
part of the sentence’s overall meaning which is transparent. For some
sentences, the structure is less obvious and only becomes clear when
other aspects of the sentence’s meaning are in place. An example of such
a sentence is He me given by Van Dijk (1976: 44). Appearing on its own
this sentence may be judged ungrammatical but appearing as part of the
discourse in (10), its meaning can be determined.
(10) a. Did you hit him?
b. No. He me.
Knowing its meaning implies knowing its structure. A different senten-
tial context can lead to the rejection of the same utterance:
(11) a. Where is he going?
b. I don’t know. He me.
In this case, it is very possible that the utterance made by a does not
lead to an understanding of b’s He me response. We could guess that
what is meant is the sentence He didn’t tell me but our linguistic knowl-
edge tells us that, unlike hit in the previous context, didn’t tell cannot be
omitted from the sentence in this context. Thus, a structure which fits in
with the surrounding context and with our linguistic knowledge cannot
be found, and the utterance must be rejected.
Chomsky (1964) and Ziff (1964) distinguish between those sentences
which are interpretable out of context and those which need a context
in order to be interpreted. Chomsky (1964) terms the former “grammati-
cal” and the latter “semi-grammatical”. A similar position is taken by
those who view grammaticality as a graded rather than a dichotomous
property (Lakoff 1973; Aarts et al. 2004). It could be argued that the
binary grammatical/ungrammatical distinction could be maintained if
the mathematical view of language as a set of sentences was rejected and
replaced by one in which sentences only exist as part of a real communi-
cation. Viewing language as a set of sentences forces us to decide upon
the set membership of an utterance such as He me when it is clear that
it belongs both to the set of sentences (when appearing in the discourse
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context (10)) and to the set of non-sentences (when appearing in the
discourse context (11)). According to Newmeyer (1983: 55), the unclear
cases are those that “with a little imagination can be given a context in
which they sound perfectly acceptable.” If this is true, supplying a
context along with a sentence takes the imagination element out of the
judgement process and should result in fewer unclear cases. A similar
point was made by Lakoff (1971), Snow (1975) and Crain and Steedman
(1985). It seems obvious, therefore, that when a sentence’s grammatical-
ity is being judged, its sentential context must be available. With this in
mind, the ungrammatical sentences which could be used to inform the
ungrammatical component of the grammar proposed in this paper
should be observed and then judged in their natural context as part
of the basic linguistic process of understanding written language, i.e.,
reading.
Another advantage of collecting instances of ungrammaticality in
context is that it allows some sentences to be included as evidence which
might be excluded if they were encountered out of context. This kind of
sentence needs a context to make it ungrammatical and is, therefore, the
opposite of the elliptical He me case discussed which needed a context
to be considered grammatical. An example is (12):
(12) We can order then directly from the web.
Taken out of context, it is not difficult to imagine a context in which
the verb order is occurring without an object and is being modified by
the adverb then. Little room is left for imagination when the sentence is
viewed in its discourse context which is an email discussion about buying
a present for someone. In this context it is clear that the word then is
really a mistyped form of the object pronoun them.
7. Applying the method
Between July 2002 and January 2004 I applied Definition 2 to the senten-
ces I encountered while reading, resulting in a corpus of ungrammatical
written English. The corpus contained 923 sentences and approximately
20,000 words (Foster and Vogel 2004; Foster 2005). In constructing this
corpus, I occasionally encountered sentences which were not ungram-
matical according to Definition 2, but which I think are worthy of men-
tion.
Despite the fact that the sentences are encountered in context, it is still
possible (although rare) to find a sentence which is ambiguous between
a grammatical and ungrammatical reading. An example is the following
which appeared in an email discussion between friends debating restau-
rant choices:
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(13) I hear that that Antonio’s is a nice place but I’m sure Peter wants
to go there to remind him of Erasmus!!
In this example it is quite probable that the second that is a duplica-
tion error and that the sentence is ungrammatical according to Defini-
tion 2. However, this does not represent a clear case because there is
a second contextually plausible reading in which the second that is a
demonstrative determiner and that Antonio’s is a noun phrase.
Another example is the (in my opinion) stylistically awkward (14),
which appeared in a newspaper article:
(14) We even offer the older members to mark their bingo cards for
them while they go outside and have a cigarette.
(15) We even offer to mark the older members’ bingo cards for them
while they go outside and have a cigarette.
While I might prefer (14) to be rewritten as (15), it would be misguided
to conclude that an error has occurred. There is something about this
particular ditransitive use of the verb offer in (14) that I find not quite
right, but it is not clear to me that my opinion would be shared by
others. As Sampson (this issue) points out, we all have our own experi-
ences of language which lead us to use certain constructions and avoid
others. A similar case is Sentence (16) which appeared in an email writ-
ten by a non-native English speaker:
(16) I am Tamara who is doing a Phd in genetics.
(17) I am Tamara and I am doing a Phd in genetics.
The problem with (16) is that it seems like an unnatural way of ex-
pressing what a native speaker would express using a sentence such as
(17). It is the use of the non-restrictive relative clause which marked the
sentence as odd, but as with (14), having a vague sense that a sentence
is in someway abnormal is not the same thing as knowing for definite
that an error has occcured. Sentences (14) and (16) are similar to the
Dunster constructions discussed by Sampson (this issue): they should be
included in the first grammatical component of the grammar proposed
in this article, rather than the ungrammatical component.
Thus, the idea in applying this type of grammaticality judgement is to
judge as ungrammatical only those utterances where one is certain that
an error has occurred, and not sentences which a sub-editor or a lan-
guage teacher might rephrase. Applying the definition to build a corpus
of ungrammatical English sentences (Foster 2005) resulted in ungram-
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matical sentences which could be described as mundane  approxi-
mately 90% could be corrected by just one application of a correction
operator (inserting, replacing or deleting a word).4 This concept of un-
grammaticality is close to that labelled “impoverished” by Sampson (this
issue). I would argue, however, that an impoverished notion is better
than a confused one which results from judging sentences out of context
and is better than no concept at all.
8. Conclusion
In this article I have argued that an empirical distinction between gram-
matical and ungrammatical sentences can by maintained by applying
grammaticality judgements to real sentences in their real context. The
distinction which results can be used as evidence for a grammar which
would allow parsers to accurately parse the kind of ungrammatical sen-
tences that people typically produce. To extend the “sentences as roads”
analogy used by Sampson (this issue), the ungrammatical sentences that
I think should be included in grammatical description could be seen as
roads (some less travelled than others) with potholes in them.
Dublin City University
Notes
* Author’s e-mail address: <jfoster@computing.dcu.ie>.
1. Unless otherwise stated, all example sentences are taken from a corpus of ungram-
matical sentences collected by the author, or abbreviated and/or anonymised ver-
sions of the corpus sentences (see Foster 2005 for a detailed description of this
corpus).
2. Downloaded as reranking-parserJune06.tar.gz from ftp://ftp.cs.brown.edu/pub/
nlparser/ in July 2006.
3. Stefanowitsch (2006) argues that a corpus can be a source of negative evidence,
contrary to the traditional generative grammar claim that it cannot. By applying
collostructional analysis to corpus data, accidentally absent constructions can be
distinguished from significantly absent ones, and those which are significantly
absent can be considered to be ungrammatical. This is a different position to the
one taken by Sampson, who argues that negative evidence is not actually required.
4. A notable exception is the following sentence which occurs in a message which
used to pop up on my laptop screen when the laptop was either connected to or
disconnected from the main power supply: LaptopsRUs Hotkey Utility show the
indicators on your display and save brightness adjustments each power supplying
conditions.
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